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MUTUALITY OF OBLIGATION IN
CONTRACT LAW
E. Allan Farnsworth*
No field of law study, certainly none in the first year curriculum, is richer in leitmotif than is that of contracts. Much of the
challenge to the beginning student lies in untangling these recurrent
themes, such as bargain, reasonable expectations and reliance, to
take but a few. In the following pages I shall attempt to unravel one
such theme that is of contemporary significance in the development
of contract law-that of mutuality of obligation.
The principle of mutuality of obligation can be simply stated:
If'two parties are to be bound by an exchange of promises, neither
one is bound until the other is bound. We are going to look at the
erosion of this principle in modern contract law. But first, a little
whimsy may provide some insight into the principle itself.
Let your imagination carry you back over a century to Friday,
June 12, 1874. The scene is the railway station at Darlington in the
North of England. The time is seven o'clock in the morning. Enter
John Dodds, on his way to catch a train. He looks harried. For some
time he has been trying to sell his estate at Croft near Darlington.
Two days ago he gave a written offer to George Dickinson, the offer,
"to be left over until Friday, 9 o'clock a.m." In the meantime he has
succeeded in selling it to another purchaser, Thomas Allan, and has
signed a contract with him. Now he is off to the train. Dodds has
not yet told Dickinson of his contract with Allan. It is possible that
he mistakenly thinks that he cannot revoke his offer to Dickinson.
But in any case that offer is only good until nine this morning.
Lurking in the wings is Dickinson and a man named Berry.
Dickinson looks worried. He would like to buy the Croft property.
Yesterday afternoon he happened to hear from Berry that Dodds
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had sold the property to Allan. He then tried to deliver an acceptance to Dodds at Dodds' mother-in-law's, where Dodds
was staying,
but failed. He and Berry have now come to the station
armed with
copies of Dickinson's acceptance in the hope that
one of them can
catch Dodds before he leaves. Enter Berry. He recognizes
Dodds and
hands him a copy of Dickinson's acceptance. Dodds
replies that it
is too late, that he has already sold the property to
Allan. Dickinson
himself enters, finds Dodds entering a railway carriage,
hands him
another copy of his acceptance, and is told he
is too late. Exit
Dickinson, demanding specific performance. The
curtain falls.
The curtain rises on the finale. The time is 1876,
two years
later. Dickinson has sued Dodds and obtained a
decree of specific
performance. Dodds has appealed. The scene is the
Chancery Division of the Court of Appeal. Enter the lord justices,
James, Mellish
and Baggalay. James and Mellish deliver their celebrated
opinions
in Dickinson v. Dodds,' unanimously overturning
the decision
below. Dodds had no contract with Dickinson.
Dodds' offer was
revoked when Dickinson learned indirectly through
Berry of Dodds'
sale to Allan. Music rises while the rule of indirect
revocation is
enshrined as "the rule of Dickinson v. Dodds. "2
The curtain falls.
Now speculate on what might have happened
if Dickinson
rather than Berry had been the first to find Dodds
at the station.
Although Dodds may well have been unaware of
Berry's business
and surprised that he carried Dickinson's acceptance,
he could
scarcely have been unaware of Dickinson's reason
for coming to the
station at dawn. Enter Dickinson, instead of Berry.
Dodds recognizes him immediately and calls out, "I have sold
the estate at Croft
to Thomas Allan." Dickinson then hands him a copy
of his acceptance. Exit Dickinson, demanding specific performance.
The curtain
falls.
This time the curtain does not rise again. There
is no finale.
Dickinson's solicitor has explained to him that
he has no case
against Dodds. The Lord Justices of the Chancery
Division of the
Court of Appeal never hear of Dickinson, Dodds,
Berry and Allan.
Their names remain in oblivion. And the rule
of indirect revocation-if, indeed there ever is such a rule-comes
to be known by
names other than those of Dickinson and Dodds.
Dickinson's solicitor knows what every student of the common law
knows: that if the
offeror manages to blurt out a revocation even an
instant before the
1. 2 Ch. 463 (1876).
2. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT
CONTRACTS

(SECOND)
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§ 42 (1932).
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offeree accepts, there is no contract. Those of us who have invested
time and effort in reading the opinions of James and Mellish in
Dickinson v. Dodds can rejoice that it was Berry and not Dickinson
who first found Dodds in the Darlington Station at dawn. We may
even suspect that that clever rascal, George Dickinson, also knew
what every student of the common law knows and therefore had
Berry approach Dodds while he, Dickinson, hid behind a railroad
carriage. Should this suspicion be correct, George Dickinson well
deserves the century of notoriety that he has shared with John
Dodds since the encounter at the Darlington Station.
As it turned out, Dickinson's forethought in sending Berry did
not win his case for him-he was done in by the indirect revocation
rule of Dickinson v. Dodds. Had this not been so, the very outcome
of the case would have turned on whether his acceptance had come
an instant before or an instant after Dodds' revocation at the Darlington Station.
What sort of a system of contract law would tolerate such apparent caprice-reminiscent of a Western gun duel-in which success turns on who has not the fastest gun but the fastest tongue?
There are two questions here. First, why let the offeror off scot-free
if he revokes an instant before the offeree accepts? Second, why hold
the offeror to a contract if the offeree accepts an instant before the
offeree revokes? This second question requires us to ask why a party
is liable in damages for breach of a promise on which the promisee
3
that inquiry here.
has in no way relied, and I shall not undertake
It is the first question that concerns us. Why is the offeror free to
revoke his offer at any time until acceptance? In the context of
Dickinson v. Dodds, why-if Dodds' offer were still in effect-should Dickinson have to make sure that his acceptance beat
Dodds' revocation?
The simple answer to that question is that Dodds' offer is revocable until acceptance. But then why is that so? Why is an offer
revocable until acceptance? The answer to that question is because
of the principle of mutuality of obligation. Since the offeree is not
bound until he makes the promise embodied in his acceptance, the
offeror is not bound by the promise embodied in his offer. Until
Dickinson makes his promise to buy the estate at Croft, Dodds is
not bound by his promise to sell the estate and is free to revoke his
offer. But what is the reason for the principle of mutuality of
obligation? The answer to that question lies in the deeply rooted
3. For some answers, see Fuller and Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 61-62 (1936).
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policy of the common law against allowing one party to speculate
at the expense of the other, at least where the other had not agreed
to bear the risk.
If there is a period of time during which one party is bound
while the other is not, the party who is not bound has in effect an
option and can speculate at the expense of the party who is bound.
Consider the paradigm case of an offer for the sale of goods, such as
cotton, at a fixed price on a fluctuating market. If there is a period
of time during which the seller is bound to sell cotton at $100,000
but the buyer is not bound to buy it, the buyer has an option to buy
at $100,000 during that period. If the market price for the cotton
should rise to $110,000 during the period, the buyer can take advantage of the lower price at which the seller is bound and insist that
he deliver the cotton for $100,000. But if the market price should fall
to $90,000 during the period, the buyer can ignore the option and
take advantage of the lower market price by buying the cotton elsewhere for $90,000, leaving the seller to sell his cotton on the depressed market. The party who is not bound thus has the chance to
speculate on market changes at the expense of the party who is
bound. It is the supposed unfairness of giving this advantage to one
of the parties, at least if the other party has not agreed to it, that
leads to the traditional rule that neither party is bound until the
other is bound. Traditional analysis of the agreement process attaches great importance to the principle of mutuality of obligation
as a means of avoiding such opportunities for speculation. It may
help to look at three examples.
A simple example is that of a late acceptance of an offer that
has already lapsed. Suppose that a seller offers a buyer cotton at
$100,000, the offer to lapse if he has not heard from the buyer by
Monday. He does not receive the buyer's purported acceptance until
Tuesday. Does the seller have a choice either to treat the acceptance
as having arrived too late, or to "waive" the delay simply by disregarding it and treat the acceptance as effective to create a contract?
Or is the purported acceptance a counter-offer that the offeror must
in turn accept? Traditional contract law insists upon the latter solution. Since the buyer's late acceptance is a counter-offer, theoretically, it can be revoked by the buyer at any time before the seller
accepts, thus preserving the principle of mutuality of obligation., To
allow the seller simply to "waive" the delay and insist on a contract,
4. Bridge v. O'Callahan, 118 N.Y.S. 2d 837 (Rochester City Ct. 1953)(quoting
Williston,
"An offeror who receives an acceptance which is too late ... cannot
at his election regard it
as valid."). See 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 92, 93 (3rd ed. 1957).
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would open the possibility of speculation by the seller, who might
choose to "waive" the delay if the market price of cotton went down
and treat the acceptance as having arrived too late if the market
price went up.5
Another example is that of acceptance by silence of an offer
that states that silence shall constitute acceptance. Suppose that a
seller offers a buyer cotton at $100,000 and adds, "If I do not hear
from you by Monday, I will take it that you have accepted." The
buyer does not reply. Clearly the seller cannot hold him to a contract. Even as the master of his offer, the seller cannot impose on
the buyer the burden of speaking if he would refuse the offer. As
Karl Llewellyn expressed it, to give that effect to invited silence "in
a systematics centering on overt manifestations is . . . almost
lewd." But if the buyer wishes, can he choose to treat his silence
as an acceptance effective to bind the seller? The principle of mutuality would appear to require an answer in the negative, for otherwise the buyer could refuse to be bound if the market price of cotton
went down but choose to treat his silence as an acceptance if the
market price went up. But although there is some authority for this
result,7 here the answer is less clear. It is possible that the offeree
may have relied on the offeror's statement inviting acceptance by
silence, and, if this is the case, the policy in favor of protecting such
justified reliance may overcome the principle of mutuality of obligation. You may recall that Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§72(1)(b) so completely succumbs to this argument that it allows
the offeree to treat his silence as acceptance if he "intends to accept
the offer" even if he shows no actual reliance.' According to the
commentary, "the offeree is entitled to rely on such a statement,"
and "the offeror who has invited such an acceptance cannot com5. But cf. Phillips v. Moor, 71 Me. 78 (1880). If it be conceded that the acceptance came
too late, as long as the offeree "makes known his acceptance ... within any period which
he could fairly have supposed to be reasonable," the maker must promptly make known his
intention "to retract on account of the delay" or "be regarded as waiving any objection." Id.
at 80.
6. Llewellyn, Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance, II, 48 YALE L.J. 779,
801 n.35 (1939).
7. Prescott v. Jones, 69 N.H. 305, 41 A. 352 (1898). The insured claimed acceptance by
silence when the insurer notified the insured that they would renew the policy unless notified
to the contrary. But the insurer
could not so frame [its offer] as to render the [insured] liable as having accepted it,
merely because he did not communicate his intention not to accept it. And if the
[insured] was not bound by the offer . . . , the [insurer] could not be, because "it
takes two to make a bargain," and, as contracts rest on mutual promises, both parties
are bound or neither is bound.
Id.at 353.
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 72(1)(b) (1973).
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plain of the resulting uncertainty." 9 One may question whether it
was wise to go this far, but perhaps the matter is not of great practical importance.
A final and more complex example is one that occurs in contracts by correspondence when an offeree who has already dispatched an acceptance overtakes its acceptance by a withdrawal or
rejection sent by a more rapid means of communication. Suppose
that a buyer mails an acceptance of a seller's offer to sell cotton at
$100,000. It then changes its mind and sends the seller a telegram
saying "acceptance mailed earlier is withdrawn." If the telegram
arrives before the letter, is it effective to withdraw the acceptance
so that there is no contract? Traditional contract law answers no.
You will recall that the "mailbox rule" of Adams v. Lindsell1 0 deprives the offeror, the seller, of its power to revoke as soon as the
offeree, the buyer, dispatches his acceptance. To allow the buyer to
countermand his acceptance while it was in transit, would permit
it to do so if the market price for cotton went down but to do nothing
if the market price went up. The effect would be to give the offeree
an option while the acceptance is in transit. Traditional contract
doctrine respects the principle of mutuality of obligation by extending the "mailbox rule" so that dispatch of the acceptance not only
deprives the offeror of its power to revoke its offer, but also deprives
the offeree of its power to countermand its acceptance." The rare
case in which the countermand does not mention the acceptance
can be dealt with by the notion of estoppel. If the offeree overtakes
his letter of acceptance by a telegram that says simply "reject your
offer," without mentioning the acceptance in transit, an offeror who
has relied on the misleading telegram should be allowed to maintain
that the offeree is estopped to enforce the contract." The offeree, as
author of the misleading telegram, can scarely complain that this
rule is subject to abuse by the offeror who is minded to speculate.
Now add to the overtaking countermand of an acceptance a
mistake by the offeree in accepting. The courts have traditionally
taken ,a jaundiced view of claims to relief based on "unilateral"
mistake once a contract has been formed, but this hard attitude has
begun to soften, 3 and is difficult to justify if there has been no
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 72, Comment c (1973).
10. 1 B. & Aid. 681, 106 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B. 1818).
11. Morrison v. Thoelke, 155 So. 2d 889 (Fla. App. 1963) (telephone call overtook
letter); Postal Telegraph Co. v. Willis, 93 Miss. 540, 47 So. 380 (1908) (usage could not vary
rule where telephone call overtook telegram); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 64
(1973).
12. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 64, Comment c and Illustration 7 (1973).

13.

See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF CONTRACTS §
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reliance by the other party. The policy favoring enforcement of the
expectation interests as of the instant of the bargain scarcely seems
to outweigh the arguments favoring relief for mistake. And if a
situation could be imagined in which no reliance by the other party
were possible, the case favoring relief for mistake would be most
appealing. So it was in Dick v. United States14 in which the offeree
erred in reading the government's offer as calling for only one set of
propellors rather than two, mailed his acceptance and, on discovering his mistake, sent a telegram that overtook his acceptance. The
offeror could not have relied on an acceptance of which it was still
unaware. The offeree could not have used an opportunity to withdraw for the purpose of speculation. No policy argued against withdrawal on the ground of mistake. Instead of fashioning a narrow
exception to the "mailbox rule" in the case of the overtaking countermand, however, the Court of Claims rejected the rule in its entirety, offending the principle of mutuality and allowing speculation
in cases where no mistake is involved.
The free revocability of offers, founded on the principle of mutuality of obligation, leaves the offeree at the offeror's mercy until
the offeree accepts. Although the law of restitution allows the offeree
to recover any benefit that he has conferred on the offeror if the
negotiations fail, this falls short of reimbursing the offeree for expenses incurred and far short of protecting his expectation interest.
But what if the offeree wants the power to speculate at the
offeror's expense and the offeror is willing to grant that power? The
common law required the parties to structure their transaction so
that it met the requirements for enforceable agreements generally.
First, the offeror had to agree to the irrevocability of his offer. Second, his agreement had to be enforceable as a promise-supported
by a seal or by consideration.
The widespread abolition of the seal left the doctrine of consideration as the principal device for meeting this second requirement.
If the offeree was to subject the offeror to the risk of speculation, he
had to pay for an option. You will recall that John Dodds' offer was
"to be left over until Friday, 9 o'clock a.m." Dickinson had paid
nothing for this. Even if this were understood as an agreement by
him not to revoke it before that time, rather than as merely the time
when it expires if not sooner revoked, it would have been unenforceable for want of consideration.
But many offers in which the offeror agreed not to revoke differed markedly from our paradigm case of the offer to sell cotton at
14.

82 F. Supp. 326 (Ct. C1. 1949).
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$100,000. There may be no fluctuating market for the subject of the
contract. The offeror may be in no hurry to have a response from
the offeree. The offeree may need to spend time and effort to determine whether to accept. Where there is little chance of speculation
the virtues of the symmetry produced by the principle of mutuality
of obligation are less evident. The requirement of consideration
began to crumble. Courts winked at the requirement of consideration. Even the smallest "peppercorn" would suffice as consideration
for an option. 5 Even a false recital of a payment that had not been
made might suffice, a rule now dignified, with qualification, by the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts."8 In New York the legislature
dispensed with consideration where there was a signed writing stating that the offer was irrevocable."7 The Uniform Commercial Code
followed suit as to offers for the sale of goods in section 2-205.1s And
reliance as well as consideration might make an agreement not to
revoke an offer enforceable. But in all of these cases the offeror had
said that his offer was irrevocable, or at least acquiesced in the
offeree's saying so. What if nothing was said by either party?
The first recognition that an offer might be irrevocable even
when nothing was said came in another context-the "unilateral"
offer where the offer invited acceptance not by a promise but by
performance. If the performance took time, it was hard on the offeree to allow the offeror to revoke at any time until performance
has been completed. Could the offeror, in that most notorious of
hypotheticals, go scot-free if he shouted "I revoke" first before the
offeree had finished crossing the Brooklyn Bridge? 9 No, said the
original Restatement and later the Restatement Second.'" The offeree should be protected by finding an "implied subsidiary promise" by the offeror not to revoke the offer while the offeree was in
the course of performance: The risk that an offeree walking across
the Brooklyn Bridge might, at the offeror's expense, speculate on a
15. E.g., Mier v. Hadden, 148 Mich. 488, 111 N.W. 104 (1907) (one dollar was "a
valuable consideration . . . paid for the contract").
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89B(1)(a) (1973).
17. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1109 (McKinney 1978).
18. U.C.C. § 2-205:
Firm Offers. An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed writing which
by its terms gives assurance that it will be held open is not revocable, for lack of
consideration, during the time stated or if no time is stated for a reasonable time, but
in no event may such period of irrevocability exceed three months; but any such term
of assurance on a form supplied by the offeree must be separately signed by the offeror.
19. The hypothetical was posed in Wormser, The True Conception of Unilateral
Contracts, 26 YALE L.J. 136-37 (1916).
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 45 (1973); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 45
(1932).
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fluctuating market for the offeree's services (perhaps in walking
across other bridges) was not to be taken seriously. That the problem continues to be discussed in the context of classroom hypotheticals and Restatement language rather than decided cases, suggests
that its significance is largely academic. Practical applications of
commercial significance appear to be limited to exclusive listings of
real estate brokers. 2' Here, too, the risk that a broker as offeree
seeking to find a purchaser under an exclusive listing might, at the
expense of the owner as offeror, speculate on a fluctuating market
broker's services is not to be taken seriously.
for the
The most important extension of the notion that an offer might
become irrevocable even when nothing was said came in the context
of attempts by subcontractors to revoke their bids, usually, although not necessarily, on the ground of mistake. Let your imagination again take you back, this time to the morning of July 29, 1955.
William Drennan, a general contractor, is driving to Los Angeles.
Yesterday he was awarded the "Monte Vista School Job." He has
stopped by the office of Star Paving to tell Star this and to say that
he accepts Star's offer to do the paving as subcontractor for
$7,131.60. The curtain rises on Star's office. Star's construction engineer is at his desk. He looks troubled. He has just discovered that
because of an error in computation, Star's bid was less than half of
what it should have been. Enter Drennan. He politely introduces
himself. Before he has a chance to say more, Oppenheimer interrupts him to explain that the bid is based on a mistake and that
Star cannot honor it. Exit Drennan, threatening suit. The curtain
falls.
The curtain rises on the finale. The time is 1958, three years
later. (Justice is not so swift this time.) Drennan has paid $10,948.60
to have another firm do the work and has sued for the difference
of $3,817.00 and had a judgment for that amount. Star has appealed. The scene is the Supreme Court of California. Enter the
justices. Justice Traynor delivers his celebrated opinion in Drennan
v. Star Paving,22 and the court unanimously affirms the decision
below. There was an "implied subsidiary promise" by Star not to
revoke its bid, analogous to the "implied subsidiary promise" in the
Brooklyn Bridge hypothetical. That "implied subsidiary promise"
became enforceable when Drennan relied on it by incorporating
Star's bid when it submitted its own bid. Music rises while the
holding of the Drennan case is enshrined as the "option contract"
21.
22.

E.g., Baumgartner v. Meek, 126 Cal. App. 2d 505, 272 P.2d 552 (1954).
51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958).
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rule of section 89B(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. 3
The curtain falls.
Now speculate on what might have happened if Drennan had
been less polite and had accepted before introducing himself to
Oppenheimer. Enter Drennan who says, "I accept your bid of
$7,131.60." Oppenheimer then explains the mistake. Exit Drennan
threatening suit. The curtain falls.
This time the curtain does not rise again. There is no finale.
Star's lawyer has explained to it that it is bound to do the job for
Drennan under its bid. The justices of the Supreme Court of California never hear of Drennan and Star Paving. Their names remain in
oblivion and the option contract rule of section 89B(2) is associated
with a case bearing other names.
What is noteworthy is that Drennan prevailed on the actual
facts in spite of his politeness-that Star's offer was held to be
irrevocable because of Drennan's reliance on an "implied subsidiary
promise" by Star not to revoke-a promise implied by analogy to
the "implied subsidiary promise" in section 45 of the Restatement
of Contracts.24 Although Star had said nothing as to the irrevocability of its bid, it was bound although Drennan was not bound. What
of the risk of speculation by Drennan? Perhaps the risk of market
fluctuations is not great if the period of irrevocability is the relatively brief time between the moment when the general contractor
submits its bid and the moment when, after award, it has had a
reasonable time to accept the subcontractor's bid. The risk that the
general contractor will take advantage of the irrevocability of the
subcontractor's bid to engage in "bid shopping" to get a still lower
bid remains, and is at the root of most of the criticism of the result
in the Drennan case.
In any case, a prudent offeror can avoid the option contract
rules of either section 45 or 89B(2) simply by providing the contrary
in his offer. Would the same be true of that most recent of the major
inroads on the principle of mutuality of obligation-Hoffman v. Red
Owl Stores, Inc. ?'- You will recall that there the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin allowed Hoffman, the expectant franchisee, to recover
from Red Owl, the supposed franchisor, his expenditures in reliance
on Red Owl's assurances that he would be given a franchise. Could
Red Owl have protected itself by disclaimers of liability, made at
strategic points as it led Hoffman down the garden path? Does it
23.
24.
25.

§ 89B(2) (1973).
§ 45 (1973).
26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF CONTRACTS

OF CONTRACTS
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make a difference whether Red Owl's liability is viewed as in contract or in tort or in some no-man's land between the two? In the
dozen years since Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., courts have
made no major pronouncements on questions, such as these, that it
raises.
In the short run, then, the erosion of the principle of mutuality
of obligation has abated. One suspects, not for long. Those of you
whose practice will cover the last quarter of this century and the
first quarter of the next would do well to keep your eyes on this
leitmotif and watch for further significant inroads in this traditional
doctrine.
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